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Abstract 
Coordination on focal points in one shot games can often be explained by team reasoning, a 
departure from individualistic choice theory. However, a less exotic explanation of coordination is 
also available based on best-responding to uniform randomisation. We test the team reasoning 
explanation experimentally against this alternative, using coordination games with variable losses in 
the off-diagonal cells. Subjects’ responses are observed when the behaviour of their partner is 
determined in accordance with each theory, and under game conditions where behaviour is 
unconstrained. The results are more consistent with the team reasoning explanation. Increasing the 
difficulty of the coordination tasks produces some behaviour suggestive of response to 
randomisation, but this effect is not pronounced.  
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Focal Points Revisited: Team Reasoning, the Principle of Insufficient Reason 
and Cognitive Hierarchy Theory 
 
Introduction 
Recent evidence from one-shot coordination games has been interpreted as showing that individuals 
making causally independent choices actually act in concert, asking themselves “What should we 
do?” (Bardsley et al. 2010). According to this ‘Team Reasoning’ (TR) hypothesis, an individual 
identifies a profile of strategies which is optimal for her team and then performs her part in it 
unconditionally. This has been invoked to explain coordination by Bacharach (1999, 2006) and 
Sugden (1995), drawing on Schelling (1960). We report on experiments that test the TR explanation 
against an alternative conjecture which grounds coordination in responses to potential 
randomisation by the other. This alternative can be seen as an application of the Principle of 
Insufficient Reason (PIR) or of Cognitive Hierarchy Theory (CHT).  The PIR/CHT hypothesis is 
consistent with the usual individualistic reasoning of decision and game theory, with the agents 
asking themselves “What should I do?”. Our results are more consistent with the TR explanation. 
We define a coordination game as a game with multiple, strict, pure-strategy Nash equilibria 
along the leading diagonal of the game matrix. Most behavioural implementations, including the 
designs discussed in section 1, study games with zero payoffs in the off-diagonal cells. We consider 
one-shot games only.1 ‘Pure’ coordination games are defined as ones with payoff-identical equilibria. 
Nothing within their payoff structure enables a particular equilibrium to be selected by standard 
theory. Yet people often solve tasks which seem to instantiate them with high success rates 
(Schelling, 1960; Mehta et al., 1994; Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997; Bardsley et al. 2010).  
In ‘impure’ variants the equilibria are Pareto-ranked. These games therefore seem even 
simpler, perhaps trivial, for real players. But they remain puzzling to many commentators, since 
within the standard framework of common knowledge of rationality the theoretical problem of 
equilibrium selection still obtains (Regan, 1980; Hollis, 1998; Bacharach 2006). Where there is a 
payoff dominant equilibrium (PDE) this serves empirically as a strong attractor, but its magnetism is 
essentially unexplained within full rationality game theory. It is utility-maximising to choose the PDE 
strategy if and only if one expects the other to do so with sufficient probability, that is, but the same 
also holds for every other equilibrium strategy. This leaves the expectation of the PDE strategies 
ungrounded. The same holds for other equilibrium refinements, including risk dominance and the 
                                                          
1
 Repeated games provide additional means of coordination via signalling which would confound the study of 
the issues we are investigating. 
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maximum of a game’s potential function (Monderer and Shapley, 1996), which coincide with PDE in 
2x2, and n-strategy, coordination games respectively.2  
TR and PIR/CHT offer competing explanations of equilibrium selection in one-shot 
coordination games, where for the games typically studied they predict PDE. We set out the existing 
empirical support for TR in section 1 but show that best responding to randomisation can explain 
much of the same data in section 2. We then test the two accounts experimentally, using a game for 
which they produce distinct predictions (section 3). In a second experiment we increase the 
cognitive difficulty of coordination on the PDE to see whether this affects the relative success of the 
theories (section 4). The experiments use an original design in which, in one treatment, control over 
one subject’s decision is allocated to the computer. This enables us to model, behaviourally, 
responses to randomisation and to TR, for comparison to game data. Section 5 provides 
interpretation and discussion, and section 6 concludes. 
 
1. Apparent Evidence for Team Reasoning 
On the TR account, faced with equal best equilibria agents transform a coordination game 
into a suitable impure coordination game. In the impure coordination game, agents consider which 
set of actions would be best for them and play their part in it. Consider for example a game in which 
two players share a prize if and only if they nominate the same integer. According to Schelling (1960, 
p94), if players consider possible decision rules that might occur to their partner, including choosing 
a personal favourite, a culturally significant number and so on, each will be led to conclude that the 
best rule is to choose the number that is most clearly unique. This rule gives the best chance of 
coordination if both players adopt it. Because the number 1 is rather obviously unique in being the 
first integer, players using that rule will tend to coordinate on the number 1. In contrast, if they were 
merely picking a number for no particular reason they might well select a favourite number, or a 
culturally prominent one. This contradicts Lewis’s (1969) account of coordination based on 
psychological salience, meaning attention-attracting properties which serve as tie-breakers amongst 
equal-best options. 
Mehta et al. (1994) reported cases of pure coordination games which confirmed Schelling’s 
conjecture (and his own informal experiments) about differences between coordination and mere 
picking. However, relatively few tasks in Mehta (1994) returned data with different picking and 
coordination distributions, so it was possible that biased beliefs about what was psychologically 
salient could explain the differences. Bardsley et al. (2010) therefore added a ‘guessing’ treatment, 
in which subjects had to guess another subject’s choice in a picking treatment. TR predictions were 
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 We note that a prediction of risk dominance in 2x2 games is sometimes explained by invoking hypothetical 
equi-probable play, as in the PIR/CHT argument set out in section 2. 
 
 
3 
based on characteristics such as ‘odd man out’ status, archetypal status, and indexical properties.3  
Impure coordination games were also studied. The authors ran two experiments, one of which 
produced strong evidence in line with TR predictions. 
 For example, in one pure coordination game, the choice set was {Ford, Ferrari, Porsche, 
Jaguar}. In the picking treatment, the modal choice was {Jaguar}, but the guessers’ modal choice was 
{Ferrari} and coordinators’ mode was {Ford}. This accorded with a prior expectation that the cars 
would be categorised according to a luxury / ordinary brand distinction. That renders the options 
{the ordinary brand, a luxury brand} and the PDE is for both players to choose {the ordinary brand}, 
since this offers certainty of coordination rather than a 1/3 chance if both choose {a luxury brand}. In 
one impure coordination game, the choice set was {10, 10, 10, 9, 9, 8}. In the picking and guessing 
treatments, most subjects selected a {10}, but in the coordinating treatment {8} was the modal 
choice. This evidence does not support the idea that subjects generally favour equilibria offering the 
highest payoffs of the (untransformed) monetary game. However, if they transform the options into 
{the 8, either 9, any 10}, the equilibrium where both players choose {8} becomes the PDE under 
plausible assumptions about risk aversion. 
 Such examples work via a partition of the original choice set into subsets containing 
different numbers of options. In a 2x2 pure coordination game, though, the choice set can only be 
partitioned into two, each half containing one option. It seems, then, that TR cannot select an 
equilibrium there, since symmetry cannot be broken.4 We therefore consider the ostensible 
evidence for TR to be restricted to pure coordination games with at least 3 strategies per player, and 
impure coordination games. 
 
2 An Alternative Mechanism for Coordination: Best-Responding to Randomisation 
Best-responding to randomisation offers an explanation of coordination within individualistic 
rationality. One proposal is that in an impure coordination game the agents apply PIR, and assign 
equal probabilities to the other player’s strategies (Gintis, 2003). If strategic reasoners start from this 
principle, then their best response will be to choose the strategy associated with the PDE. If both 
players reason in this way, then the agents will coordinate on that outcome. In impure coordination 
games, as defined in section 1, TR will therefore coincide with the application of PIR. This account 
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 An indexical property of a linguistic item is one that refers to the circumstances of its occurrence. So, for 
example, in an experiment conducted in 2005, 2005 might be focal in a choice set consisting of items labelled 
{2004, 2005, 2006, 2007} because it is the current year. 
4
 In Bacharach (2006 p22-23) an argument is given that TR can resolve 2x2 pure coordination games, such as 
the “Heads, Tails” game, where most subjects choose {Heads}. However, this relies on re-categorising the 
strategies as the options {prominent, anything}. This seems unsatisfactory because if one object of choice is 
classed as prominent, the other should, logically, be classed as non-prominent. That would render the options 
{prominent, non-prominent, anything}, maintaining symmetry. 
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amounts to an application of Harsanyi’s ‘tracing procedure’ (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) with PIR 
providing the initial beliefs. Gintis (2003) argues on these grounds that PIR renders TR superfluous as 
an explanation of coordination.  
 As an account of rational coordination, this application of PIR is controversial. For the 
assumption used to derive the players’ beliefs is apparently contradicted in the agents’ chain of 
reasoning (Bjerring, 1978). Initially, that is, there is a stipulation of uniform probabilities, but the 
players conclude that a particular strategy will be played with probability 1. Independently of this 
issue, however, it seems that PIR may still have promise as an empirical account of coordination for 
imperfectly rational actors. The players may, for example, treat implications of their initial 
assumptions as new information, as in Skyrms (1989).  
A very similar account of coordination occurs as a version of CHT. CHT posits a population 
structured by different levels of rationality, and has been formalised in ‘level-k’ theories (Stahl, 1993; 
Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Camerer et al., 2004).5 Level 0 players are the least rational and choose non-
strategically. Level 1 players optimise based on their beliefs about level 0 players’ behaviour. Level 2 
players optimise based on their beliefs about the distribution and behaviour of level 0 and level 1 
players, and so on. Agents in any level > 0 optimise based on beliefs about the rest of the players, 
who are assumed to belong to lower tiers than themselves. If one assumes uniform randomisation 
for level 0 players, as is commonly assumed in the experimental literature, and unbiased 
expectations about lower tiers’ behaviour, CHT makes the same equilibrium prediction as PIR. 
However, CHT is also capable of generating a richer set of predictions than PIR, based on auxiliary 
hypotheses about bounded rationality. We exploit this point in experiment 2 below. 
 It is important to note that coincidence between TR and PIR/CHT predictions actually occurs 
in both pure and impure coordination games. This is demonstrated by Bacharach and Stahl (2000)’s 
CHT-based framework ‘Variable Frame Level-n Theory’ (VFLNT). VFLNT invokes the same process of 
partition of the available strategies using a categorisation rule, or ‘frame’, as TR does. The ‘variable 
frame’ terminology reflects that more than one frame might apply, and that players at each level 
judge how probable different frames are to occur to players at lower levels. In the pure coordination 
game, with choice set {Ford, Ferrari, Porsche, Jaguar}, according to the TR argument expounded in 
section 1, the strategies are re-categorised as the options {the ordinary brand, a luxury brand}. In the 
re-categorised game, coordination on {a luxury brand} yields an expected 1/3 of the payoff from 
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 For simplicity we do not observe a distinction in the text between CHT and level-k theory, since they coincide 
predictively for the games we study. The theories actually differ in that in level-k theory, each level optimises 
in response to behaviour of the next lowest level. Whereas in CHT each level optimises in response to a finite 
mixture distribution defined over perceived player types and frequencies at lower levels. 
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coordination on {the ordinary brand}. At that point, VFLNT models level 0 players as uniformly 
randomising over these two options, and the best response is {the ordinary brand}.  
 The availability of two explanations which both invoke players’ unobserved re-descriptions 
of strategies threatens to seriously confound data interpretation in coordination studies. In both 
Blume and Gneezy (2010) and Crawford et al. (2008) for example, subjects had to coordinate on 
segments of partitioned discs, one of which is identified as unique by a framing involving shading. In 
each case, the prediction of coordination on this segment can be derived from either VFLNT or TR. 
Consequently, essentially the same behaviour is interpreted in Blume and Gneezy’s design as 
evidence of VFLNT, and Crawford et al.’s as evidence of TR. The alternative readings seem equally 
justified, but invoke very different modes of reasoning. It is therefore important to consider games 
where the two accounts of coordination yield clearly distinct predictions. We describe and 
empirically investigate such games below.  
  
3. Experiment 1: Game Play versus Response to Randomisation 
Gintis (2003) describes a variation on a coordination game in which TR and PIR/CHT make clearly 
distinct predictions. The games are similar to regular coordination games, in that there are multiple 
equilibria along the leading diagonal of the game matrix, but have variable losses instead of null 
payoffs in the off-diagonal cells. We refer to them as “risky coordination games”. This introduces risk 
in the sense of potential losses for coordination failure. With variable losses , play which is optimised 
against random behaviour can be separated from the PDE. In Gintis’s example, each player has to 
choose an integer in the interval [1, 10]. If each selects the same integer, each wins that number of 
monetary units. If different integers are chosen, each loses the larger of the two numbers. This gives 
rise to the normal form game matrix shown in Figure 1. The game is doubly symmetric: both players 
either win or lose the same amount in each cell. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
2 -2 2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
3 -3 -3 3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
4 -4 -4 -4 4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
5 -5 -5 -5 -5 5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 7 -8 -9 -10 
8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 8 -9 -10 
9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 9 -10 
10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 10 
 
Figure 1: Risky coordination game 
 
Here, choosing larger numbers increases the magnitude of prospective losses given uncertainty 
about the other’s selection. Standard theories of choice under uncertainty, including Expected Utility 
theory and Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), predict that an agent responding to 
uniform randomisation should choose either {2} or {3}; this prediction carries over to PIR and CHT 
(proof: Appendix 1). The TR prediction is for both to choose {10}. Gintis (2003) suggests that in this 
game TR fails comprehensively, but does not cite empirical evidence. To the best of our knowledge 
such evidence does not yet exist. We therefore test the conjecture experimentally. 
Subjects played the risky coordination game shown in Figure 1. The strategy set for each 
player consisted of integers in the interval [1,10]. In one treatment (‘human computer,’ or ‘HC’), 
control over the actions of one player in each pair was taken away. Their strategy was determined by 
computer with uniform probability. The other player in each pair was told that this was how her 
partner’s action would be determined, and had to choose an integer normally. In the second 
treatment (‘human human,’ or ‘HH’), the same subjects played under standard game conditions, 
with each player freely choosing her integer. 
 Having a computer choose on behalf of a person seems to us better controlled than having 
subjects play against a computer. For, although the determination of one player’s action was shifted 
to the computer in HC, a social choice situation was maintained, in the sense that each strategy 
selection affects the payoff of a pair of human subjects.  
 If coordination proceeds via responses to uniform randomisation, we should observe in HH 
the same pattern of choices as in HC, since HC implements randomness. According to CHT, any level 
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0 players will randomise, whilst players in level 1 best respond to randomisation, in both treatments, 
choosing from {2, 3}. Higher level players best respond to randomness in HC and to mixtures of 
lower level play in HH, but still choose from {2,3} (Appendix 1).  If, alternatively, TR is the correct 
explanation of coordination, we would expect, in contrast, that players choose {10} in HH.  
 To summarise, in experiment 1, we test the following predictions:  
i) TR predicts {10,10} in HH 
ii) PIR/CHT predicts {2,3} in HC and HH 
iii) PIR/CHT predicts there is no difference between distributions of choices in HC and 
HH 
Minor caveats apply to predictions ii) and iii). Under the CHT account (but not PIR), there should be 
some unsophisticated players in the population, that is, level 0 players, who actually randomise 
uniformly over strategies. Thus, prediction ii) can be stated more precisely for CHT as a modal 
strategy choice of {2,3} with other choices uniformly dispersed. The proportion of level 0 players is 
often modelled as vanishingly small (Camerer et al., 2004). Concerning prediction iii) PIR/CHT allows, 
only, for some switching from {2} in HC to {3} in HH depending on risk attitudes (Appendix 1). 
 
3.1 Experiment 1: Procedures 
Experiment 1 was conducted at the CREED laboratory at the University of Amsterdam (UvA) in June 
2006, with 44 subjects. Each was given a show-up fee of 15 euros, in 30 experimental currency units, 
from which potential losses could be deducted. The design was counterbalanced, with half of the 
subjects playing HC before HH, and half the opposite order, to control for potential order effects. 
Treatment HC was divided into two tasks.  In the first task the computer made the choice for one 
subject in each pair, and in the second task it made the choice for the other subject. Thus, there 
were three tasks per subject pair, two in HC and one in HH, and each subject made two choices. The 
experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes including instructions, comprehension questions and a 
single sequence of the three tasks. No feedback was given on task outcomes or earnings before the 
end of the experiment. The instructions are given in Appendix 2.  
 
3.2 Experiment 1: Results 
Choices are shown in Figure 2 below. Prediction i) is supported in the sense that the majority of 
subjects (66%) chose the TR prediction, {10}, in HH.  
 Prediction ii) is rejected since only a small minority of subjects (7% in HH and 11% in HC) 
chose a strategy from {2,3}. The modal choice in HC is {1}, which is stochastically dominated. If one 
therefore interprets choices of {1} in HH as flawed attempts to best respond to randomisation, 
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counting {1,2,3} as consistent with PIR/CHT, this would only increase the proportion to 16% of 
subjects. 
 Prediction iii) is that there is no difference of any kind between choices in HH and HC. An 
appropriate nonparametric test is the chi-square test of independence. Since the test requires 
expected cell frequencies of at least 5 (Agresti, 1996), this requires combining response categories 
into bins. A simple method is to determine the bins from the data as follows. The mode is identified 
of HH and HC choices combined, and bins comprise the mode, integers below it and integers above 
it. (All data partitions and χ2 tests in this paper, following this approach, are detailed in Table 1, 
section 4.2.) Here {10} is the overall mode and bins comprise {10} and {[1,9]}. We therefore test the 
null hypothesis of no difference between HC and HH using a chi-square test with one degree of 
freedom. The null hypothesis is rejected (χ2(1)=23.2;  p<0.01). Thus, we find strong evidence against 
prediction iii).  
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
HH
HC
 
Figure 2: Frequency Distribution of Strategy Choices in Experiment 1 
 
3.3 Interpretation of Experiment 1   
The main result of experiment 1 is that TR strongly out-performs best-responding to randomisation 
in the game of Figure 1. The very different shapes of the distributions in HH and HC make it highly 
unlikely that HH choices are based on responses to randomisation. Subjects seem unable to optimise 
in a one-shot game, since the modal choice in HC, {1}, is stochastically dominated. As {1} is the 
lowest integer, participants were probably attempting to minimise exposure to loss. However, this 
description is incomplete, since HC choices suggest a doubly censored normal distribution with an 
interior mode at roughly the mid-point of the strategy space. It is therefore not obvious how best to 
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characterise behaviour in the HC treatment overall.  We also note that around 1/3 of subjects violate 
the TR point prediction in HH. 
 
4. Experiment 2: Game Play versus Response to Team Reasoning 
Experiment 1 returned evidence favourable to the team reasoning interpretation of coordination, 
and inconsistent with the PIR/CHT accounts based on best responding to randomisation. A strict 
falsificationist might well conclude that the PIR/CHT account should be rejected. However, 
falsificationism has lost ground to views which see empirical work more as theory-developing than 
theory-refuting (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). The idea of best-responding to random behaviour seems 
strategically plausible has empirical support in some experimental contexts (Nagel, 1995). We 
therefore conducted a further test on the premise that there are some settings in which best-
responding to randomisation will operate and some settings more conducive to TR. The aim of 
experiment 2 was to gain insight into the conditions under which the PIR/CHT account, and TR, 
either succeed or fail, with the goal of informing theory development in this area.  
 Experiment 2 attempted to undermine TR, and boost consistency with PIR/CHT, by 
increasing the cognitive difficulty of the coordination problem. The rationale for this is as follows. In 
a task as computationally easy as the risky coordination game of experiment 1, it is perhaps 
unrealistic to expect there to be a cognitive hierarchy. The ‘hierarchy’ of CHT, it seems to us, is likely 
to depend on the cognitive difficulty of the decision problem. Sufficient easiness will lead, in effect, 
to cognitive equality, but higher levels of difficulty should give rise to a ranking of abilities. Our 
auxiliary hypothesis on bounded rationality is that the parameters describing a cognitive hierarchy 
are endogenous to the choice problem. This is in line with Camerer et al.’s (2004, p863 n1) 
suggestion that the frequency distribution of player types may be sensitive to the costs and benefits 
of thinking harder.  
 We suggest specifically that in harder tasks the perceived net benefits of deliberation 
compared to randomisation are diminished, resulting in an increase in the proportion of level 0 type 
players. Further, actors should be more likely both to anticipate unpredictable behaviour, and 
responses to unpredictable behaviour, as difficulty increases. We should, then, be more likely to 
observe responses to randomisation, and less likely to observe TR, in harder tasks. We therefore 
aimed to induce a cognitive hierarchy by manipulating the difficulty of calculating the TR choice. This 
was done not to test subjects’ maths ability, but to see whether behaviour is more consistent with 
the PIR/CHT account when we depart further from common knowledge of the game payoffs. 
 In experiment 1, coordination game decisions were compared to play against simulated 
randomisers so that the treatment comparison tests CHT. Experiment 2, in contrast, uses the HC 
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condition to simulate team reasoners, so that the treatment comparison tests TR. One reason for 
this was to detect strategic switching to low numbers in HH (prediction vii below). Also, we wanted 
to be evaluate the two theories in a similar manner, by letting each one represent the null 
hypothesis in an experimental test. In treatment HC, then, the integer of one of the paired players 
was predetermined according to the TR prediction. The other player was told that the computer had 
been programmed to enter the number which gives the highest joint earnings if both participants 
choose it. In HC, therefore, the choosing subject has to respond to TR. If TR is the only non-random 
process at work in HH, choices in HH and HC should be realisations of the same underlying 
distribution. According to CHT, in contrast, there will be some agents who can solve the TR 
computational problem but lack confidence that others can. So CHT predicts choices of lower 
integers in HH than in HC. 
 Three doubly symmetric games were used. They shared the feature with Experiment 1, that 
if the paired subjects chose different integers (again in the [1,10] range), they would both lose the 
larger number in currency units. If their chosen integers matched they would earn positive amounts. 
The winning amounts may, however, differ from the face value of the chosen integers, as set out 
below: 
a) ‘Low’ difficulty. Matches on prime numbers pay their face value, while matches on other 
integers pay half their face value. 
b) ‘Medium’ difficulty. A match on x pays its face value, where x = 8!/7!, while matches on 
all other integers pay half their face value. 
c) ‘High’ difficulty. A match on x pays its face value, where 959049 x , while matches on 
all other integers pay 4. 
As the labelling indicates, the tasks were constructed to increase difficulty of TR from a) to c). 
Subject recruitment was not restricted to courses with mathematical content. We therefore 
expected that there would be considerable variation in participants’ problem solving ability, and, 
therefore, good prospects of observing responses to randomisation in HH. PIR/CHT predicts low 
number choices for HH, with the exact prediction varying slightly between games as specified below. 
These tasks give rise to the normal form game matrices shown in Figure 3 below.  
 An additional motivation for experiment 2 was to eliminate the possibility that subjects in 
HH are coordinating on salient features of the strategy space in something other than the team 
reasoning sense. For example, in experiment 1, it is conceivable that 10 is simply a salient number. 
To exclude this possibility, the strategy space is the same in each game. Number salience is therefore 
held constant, whist TR selects a different integer in each case.  
 To summarise, in experiment 2, we test the following predictions: 
 
 
11 
iv. TR predicts {7} in Low, {8} in Medium and {5} in High in HH 
v. TR predicts identical distributions of choices in HC and HH, in each case 
vi. PIR/CHT predicts a mode of {2,3} in Low , {2} in Medium and {1, 2} in High, in HH 
vii. PIR/CHT predicts strategic switching to lower choices in HH compared to HC 
viii. TR will do progressively worse across Low, Medium and High in HH;  
ix. PIR/CHT will do progressively better across Low, Medium and High in HH. 
 
Low 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
2 -2 2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
3 -3 -3 3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
4 -4 -4 -4 2 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
5 -5 -5 -5 -5 5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 3 -7 -8 -9 -10 
7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 7 -8 -9 -10 
8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 4 -9 -10 
9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 4.5 -10 
10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 5 
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Medium 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0.5 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
2 -2 1 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
3 -3 -3 1.5 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
4 -4 -4 -4 2 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
5 -5 -5 -5 -5 2.5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 3 -7 -8 -9 -10 
7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 3.5 -8 -9 -10 
8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 8 -9 -10 
9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 4.5 -10 
10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 5 
 
High 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 4 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
2 -2 4 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
3 -3 -3 4 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
4 -4 -4 -4 4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
5 -5 -5 -5 -5 5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 
6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 4 -7 -8 -9 -10 
7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 4 -8 -9 -10 
8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 4 -9 -10 
9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 4 -10 
10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 4 
 
Figure 3: Risky Coordination Games in Experiment 2 
 
 
4.1. Experiment 2: Procedures 
Experiment 2 was conducted at the CREED laboratory at the University of Amsterdam, in June 2010 
and June 2011. Each subject was given a show-up fee of 15 euros, in 30 experimental currency units. 
Separate samples were drawn from the same student population for Low, Medium and High. Sample 
sizes were 30, 28 and 32 respectively. All subjects played treatment HH first and HC second in order 
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to avoid biasing HH decisions in favour of TR. Instructions for each part of the experiment were given 
only after the previous part was finished. As in experiment 1, treatment HC was divided in two tasks 
and each subject played HC once actively, and once passively with the computer making her 
decision. The computer chose according to TR. Thus, there were three tasks per subject, two of 
which involved decision making. The experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes including 
instructions, comprehension questions and one sequence of the three tasks. No feedback was given 
on outcomes or earnings before the end of the experiment. Instructions are given in Appendix 2. 
 
4.2. Experiment 2: Results 
Subjects’ choices are shown in Figure 4 below. Concerning prediction iv), the TR point prediction is 
strongly modal for choices in HH in each game, with 46%, 50% and 50% of subjects making this 
choice in Low, Medium and High respectively. Prediction v) is tested with a chi-squared test (Table 
1). This is not significant at the 5% level for any of the three tasks, but is significant at the 10% level 
for Medium and High (χ2(2) = 1.1, p=0.57; χ2(2) = 5.9, p = 0.05,  χ2(2) = 5.4, p = 0.07 respectively). 
However, combining data from the three games results in a strong rejection of the null hypothesis 
(χ2(2) = 9.5; p<0.01). Thus, prediction v) fails. 
 Prediction vi) fares poorly in comparison to prediction iv), with relatively few subjects in HH 
choosing according to the PIR/CHT point prediction. 7% of subjects conform to this prediction in 
Low, 4% in Medium and 25% in High. However, as in experiment 1, one might interpret choices of {1} 
in Low and Medium as flawed attempts at PIR/CHT. This would alter the proportions in Low and 
Medium to 13% and 29% respectively. 
 For prediction vii), a binomial test across the three games can be used to ascertain whether 
subjects who change their choice between HC and HH do so randomly. 35 subjects changed their 
decisions, with 26 of these choosing a lower number in HH. The null hypothesis that switches to 
higher and lower numbers are equi-probable is rejected (2-tailed binomial test, p < 0.01).  
 Prediction viii) is not supported by the data, since the proportion choosing consistently with 
TR does not differ significantly across the games. 
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Figure 4: Relative Frequency Distributions of Strategy Choices in Experiment 2 
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Sample Bins Partitioned Distribution 
HH HC 
 
χ2 Statistic 
(df) 
P-value 
Experiment 1 <10 
10 
 
16 38 
28 6 
 
23.2 
(1) 
 
<0.01 
Experiment 2: Low <7 
7 
>7 
 
7 4 
14 17 
9 9 
  
 
1.1 
(2) 
0.57 
Experiment 2: Medium <8 
8 
>8 
 
 
12 7 
14 12 
2 9 
  
 
5.9 
(2) 
0.05 
Experiment 2: High <5 
5 
>5 
 
 
9 3 
16 15 
7 14 
  
 
5.4 
(2) 
0.07 
Experiment 2:  Combined <5 
5 
>5 
 
 
23 9 
21 17 
46 64 
  
 
9.5 
(2) 
<0.01 
 
 Table 1: Partitioned Distributions of Choices in Experiments 1 and 2, with Chi-squared tests 
 
Note: In each case, HH and HC choices were combined to determine the overall mode of the 
distribution. The bins were then set as integers below, equal to and above this value in HH and HC 
separately. The requirement of the χ2 test that expected cell frequencies are at least 5 precludes 
general use of a finer partition.  
  
 Prediction ix) can be assessed both in relation to the point predictions of PIR/CHT and in 
terms of its prediction of a treatment effect. Concerning the point predictions, we compare the 
proportion of subjects behaving consistently with PIR/CHT in Low versus Medium, Low versus High 
and Medium versus High, using a 2-tailed Z test with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
The third test (Medium versus High) is significant at the 5% level (Z = 2.54; p = 0.02). The second 
(Low versus High) is significant at the 10% level (Z = 2.05; p = 0.08), and the first test is not 
significant. However, this analysis is dependent on not viewing choices of {1} in Low and Medium as 
attempts at best responding to randomisation. If instead we view choices of integers [1,3] as 
cohering with PIR/CHT in each game, as seems natural, there is no significant difference at the 10% 
level in each case. Concerning the treatment effect prediction, we judge whether changes of 
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decisions to higher and lower integers are equi-probable for each game separately, using a 2-tailed 
Binomial test. In Low, 63% of switches were to higher integers in HC (p = 0.29), in Medium this 
fraction was 75% (p = 0.02) and in High 82% (p = 0.01). This pattern of results is supportive of 
prediction ix). 
 
4.1. Interpretation of Experiment 2 
Overall the results of experiment 2 favour TR over PIR/CHT in all three games, despite our attempt 
to make things difficult for TR. However, the manipulation of cognitive difficulty, as measured by the 
proportion of correct choices in HC, seems not to have been as effective as intended. In HC, the 
proportion played the TR prediction in High and in Medium is not significantly different. In spite of 
this, there is evidence of a tendency towards PIR/CHT type behaviour as difficulty increases, though 
it is not pronounced. It is clear from the failure of prediction v) that TR cannot be the only non-
random process at work generating the observed data. The support for predictions vii) and ix) is 
consistent with the strategic anticipation of unpredictable behaviour in the manner envisaged by the 
PIR/CHT account, but this is a relatively minor feature of the data.  
 
5. Discussion  
The main result of this study, which is consistent across both experiments, is that the TR predictions 
fare much better than the predictions of response to uniform randomisation in risky coordination 
games.  It therefore seems implausible that PIR/CHT could account for the evidence that has been 
claimed for TR, outlined in section 2. When we simulate randomising players, we find differences in 
modal choices between HH and HC. When we simulate TR, we do not. In the absence of a convincing 
alternative explanation of our data, we conclude that the study is broadly supportive of team 
reasoning, though there are some features of the data it cannot explain.6  
 We conjectured that responding to randomisation was a plausible behavioural strategy 
where a cognitive hierarchy is likely to exist, and that this is more probable when tasks are more 
demanding. Therefore experiment 2 sought to increase the cognitive difficulty of the games. This 
resulted in some divergence between HH and HC. However, responding to randomisation did not 
become a very pronounced feature of the data as cognitive difficulty increased.  This suggests that 
CHT with uniform randomisation at level 0 may have little behavioural significance for coordination 
                                                          
6
 Capra et al (1999) and Goeree and Holt (2005) show that a stochastic generalization of an equilibrium, the 
Quantal Response equilibrium (QRE; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), characterises more choices in minimum 
effort and traveller’s dilemma games than Nash equilibrium or potential function maxima. In Appendix 1 we 
compute the QRE for our risky coordination games. Given the empirically estimated “error” parameter μ=10 
just one QRE exists in all games we study, in which players are most likely to choose low numbers {1,2,3}. For 
much lower error values, μ≤4.2, we obtain multiple QRE; in one of these QRE players choose the TR number 
with a very high probability. 
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games. This conclusion is drawn tentatively, as the manipulation of cognitive difficulty seemed not 
as effective as expected. As noted in the previous section there is nonetheless support in the data 
for a relatively weak tendency towards PIR/CHT, when the tasks became more difficult. An 
observation here on theory is that, in contrast to current CHT models, if level 0 players are rare it 
seems behaviourally implausible that they exert a great influence on decisions, especially if 
alternative modes of reasoning such as TR offer determinate advice. 
 A further reason that the PIR/CHT account performed relatively badly may be that uniform 
randomisation is not a good representation of what people do when a particular decision problem is 
beyond their ability to solve. This is suggested in particular by the pattern of HC choices in 
experiment 2, shown in Figure 4, in which the incorrect choices occurred with greater frequency 
above than below the correct answer. There, participants knew that their partner’s strategy would 
be computationally correct, regardless of its difficulty. It may therefore become defensible to choose 
a high number, if a subject knows the solution is not a low number. For example, if a subject in High 
believed the answer to be 8, 9 or 10, with equal probability, they would expect equi-probable 
payoffs of 8, -9, or -10 from choosing {8}, -9, 9 or -10 from {9}, and -10, -10 or 10 from {10}. Choices 
in the interval [1, 7] would be seen as dominated, {8} as stochastically dominated, and a risk neutral 
subject would choose from {9, 10}. 
 It therefore seems that actual behaviour in games when people are cognitively challenged is 
a complex matter. For example in High, people who were not able to spot the solution may have 
nonetheless have known that it was a number greater than, say, 3, if they understood the 
mathematical notation. In HH, they then also have to weigh the probability that their partner 
regards the problem as easy. This aspect of their decision is not currently represented in CHT, since 
CHT agents do not consider that others may be more sophisticated than themselves.  
 Regarding uniform randomisation as a characterisation of level 0, there is also evidence from 
“Buridan tasks” that it is difficult in practice to get people to randomise with uniform probabilities. 
Here, options are constructed so that there is no reason to choose one option rather than another. 
The tasks are named after the ass in the fable, which starved to death unable to choose between 
two equivalent piles of hay. Bacharach (2001) reports experiments on such problems, including pure 
coordination tasks against randomising devices. Subjects seemed to latch onto any available 
distinguishing features of options, rather than choosing at random.  
 Such considerations make it challenging to provide a tractable version of CHT capable of 
generating clear predictions for any possible game. Specifying level 0 behaviour ex ante is a key 
difficulty here. In the context of coordination games, an alternative strategy has been to adopt an 
empirical specification of level 0 choices as, in effect, in Lewis (1969), Mehta et al. (1994) and 
 
 
18 
Bardsley et al. (2010). Further behavioural research may determine whether an intermediate 
approach is possible, that is, one which organises insights across classes of games.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We subjected the TR explanation of coordination to strong experimental tests against PIR/CHT, 
which it largely withstood. Our data therefore support the view that TR is a key mechanism 
responsible for coordination. The alternative explanatory mechanism, best responding to 
randomisation, failed to organise the data in a class of games that was specifically devised to elicit it. 
Although we tried to make the alternative work by increasing the cognitive difficulty of the 
coordination problem, in the spirit of CHT, this had only limited success. The poor performance of 
responding to randomisation in the experiments reported here suggests that neither PIR nor CHT 
(with uniform randomisation at level 0) are probable explanations of the existing coordination game 
data. It seems rather that the explanatory mechanisms for focal points with empirical support are i) 
TR and ii) CHT with label salience at level 0, with ii) being necessary for 2x2 pure coordination games, 
as discussed in footnote 4.  
 We suggest that behavioural economics could contribute to CHT by further observation of 
what people do when they are cognitively unable to optimise. Also, an empirically-supported 
account seems still to be wanting of the circumstances in which TR and CHT-type reasoning 
processes obtain, though our data suggest difficulty of the coordination task may play a role. Finally, 
we believe that it is interesting and important to conduct further robustness tests of TR given its 
radical break from received versions of methodological individualism, which rational choice theorists 
typically take as axiomatic (Elster 1982, 1985).  One suggestion is as follows. The empirical research 
to date, including this report, has not sought to establish directly what is going on in game players’ 
heads, preferring to work with choice data alone. We believe there is therefore a role for qualitative 
and possibly neurological research in future, to probe the TR hypothesis more directly. 
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Appendix 1 
Proof of PIR/CHT Predictions for Experiment 1 
 
Let j denote the opponent’s chosen integer. The difference in utility, defined over experimental 
tokens, from choosing {i+1} over {i} is: 
0 if j > i+1 
U(i+1) – U(-i-1) if j = i+1 
U(-i-1) – U(i)  if j = i 
U(-i-1) – U(-i) if j < i 
 
If U′(i) > 0 for all i and the player evaluates equally the probabilities that its opponent chooses any 
strategy {j} then we can ignore probabilities and probability weights. It follows that 
 }{~}1{ ii


 U(i+1)-U(i)+(i-1)[U(-i-1)-U(-i)] 0


    (1) 
 
For i=1 this reduces to U(2) - U(1) > 0, thus strategy {2} is always preferred to strategy {1}. Strategy 
{1} is in fact stochastically dominated by strategy {2}. For strategies {2},...,{10}, (1) implies {i+1} is 
weakly preferred to {i} if and only if 
 
U(i+1) - U(i) ≥ (i-1)[U(-i) - U(-i-1)]       (2) 
 
Consider i ≥ 3. Under EUT with either risk aversion or risk neutrality, and also under Prospect Theory, 
U(i+1) - U(i)  ≤  U(-i) - U(-i-1). Therefore (2) is not satisfied, and strategy {i} is preferred to strategy 
{i+1}. Hence, under standard models of choice under risk, strategies {2} and {3} are preferred to all 
other strategies.  
 Next, consider i=2. Under risk neutrality (2) holds with equality because of the assumption 
that U′=k, so {2}~{3}. Under risk aversion U″<0, and under Prospect Theory U′(x) < U′(-x). Either 
assumption implies that (2) does not hold, so {2} is strictly preferred to {3}. 
 Finally, as under risk neutral EUT, if each player believes that the other applies PIR, then 
from an interim conclusion that {2}~{3}, it follows that {3} is preferred, since {3} is the best response 
to a 50/50 chance that j={2} and j={3}. Under CHT, if for level 1 players {2}~{3} then for levels 2 and 
above {3} is preferred, if agents at those levels infer equi-probable choices from indifference at 
lower levels. The distribution should therefore have a single mode at {3}, with the relative 
frequencies of {2} and {3} depending on those of level 1 and higher-level players. 
 Parallel derivations can be given of CHT predictions in experiment 2. 
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Quantal Response Equilibria for risky coordination games. 
 
In the discrete choice QRE players pick an action with the probability that corresponds to the 
exponential of its expected payoff. Let   π = Ap   be the vector of expected payoffs in the game given 
by matrix A, when p is the vector describing probabilities that the opponent will pick different 
actions in the game. The player will choose an action according to the ‘logit response’ (McKelvey and 
Palfrey, 1995), with the probability proportional to the exponential of its expected payoff, weighted 
by the error parameter μ:  di = exp( πi/μ ). When μ→0 the model describes rational choice, while as 
μ→∞  the behaviour converges to uniform randomization.  In the symmetric QRE the player and the 
opponent use the same probabilities, that is,  pi = di / ∑
n
k=1 dk. 
We follow Capra et al. (1999) and find QRE in our four risky coordination games by 
simulating logit response dynamics. The code used for the simulation in Mathematica is available on 
request from the authors. Starting from several thousand randomly drawn initial probability 
distributions over the possible game actions, we repeatedly calculate the logit repsonse until we 
detect that the dynamics has reached a fixed point where the distribution stops changing. This yields 
the set of QRE and their basins of attraction. For each game we find the QRE for the error parameter 
μ=10, suggested by Capra et al. (1999). For this parameter we find that all our games have a unique 
QRE in which players choose any number in {1,2,3} with a higher probability than any higher 
number.  
Other QRE which put a high probability on the TR number exist only for much lower error 
parameters μ. For each game we estimate the maximal value of μ that permits a QRE in which the TR 
number is played with the highest probability, by repeatedly decreasing μ in seps of 0.1 anf 
repeating the above procedure.  For our four risky coordination games we estimate these maximal 
error values and corresponding QRE probabilities to pick the TR number as: 
- baseline:   μ=4.2,   p10 = 0.87 
- low:  μ=3,    p7 = 0.87 
- medium: μ=3.4,   p8 = 0.86 
- high:  μ=2.3,   p5 = 0.87 
In each of the above cases there exists a second QRE where players choose any number in {1,2,3} 
with a higher probability than any higher number. This QRE has by far the largest basin of attraction. 
The QRE analysis above suggests that the likelihood to observe TR decreases as the games get 
harder and the players’ actions and beliefs become more noisy. 
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Appendix 2 
Instructions for Experiment 1 
[Our explanatory  comments, not shown in the instructions, are shown between square brackets [ ]. 
Instructions are shown for the order HH-HC] 
 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. In this experiment you can earn money. You have 
been given 30 points initially so that your points total cannot be negative. At the end of the 
experiment your points will be converted to cash, according to the exchange rate:  
2 points = 1 euro. 
 
The experiment consists of 3 independent tasks; what you earn in one task does not affect what you 
can earn in another. How much you will earn depends on your decisions and the decisions of one 
other participant, who we shall call "your paired participant". Your paired participant is randomly 
selected at the start and remains paired with you for all three tasks.  
 
Throughout the experiment you will receive no information about the decisions of your paired 
participant or any other participant. At the end of the experiment you will learn the decisions of your 
paired participant, and will see your earnings. You will then be paid your earnings in private. 
 
Next, you will be given a general description of the tasks. More detailed instructions will be given at 
the start of each task. 
 
Please do not communicate with other participants at any time.  If you have a question, please 
raise your hand. We will then come to your desk to answer it. 
 
 
General Description 
 
In each task two numbers will be determined between 1 and 10 (1 and 10 included), one for you and 
one for your paired participant. 
- If these two numbers are the same, you will both win that number of points.  
- If the numbers are different, each of you will lose the larger number of points.  
The way in which the numbers are determined is different in each task. 
To check your understanding, you will now have to answer some questions about the above 
procedure. You will receive further instructions when all participants correctly answer all questions.  
 
Control Questions 
 
To start the control questions please enter two different integer numbers between 1 and 10 in the 
two spaces below. 
 
You have entered numbers X and Y. We will use these two numbers in the questions below. 
If your number is X and the number of your paired participant is X, how many points does each win? 
If your number is Y and the number of your paired participant is Y, how many points does each win? 
If your number is X and the number of your paired participant is Y, how many points does each lose? 
If your number is Y and the number of your paired participant is X, how many points does each lose? 
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Task 1 [HH] 
 
In this task you and your paired participant each choose a number between 1 and 10 (1 and 10 
included). Remember, if both numbers are the same, each of you wins that number of points. If the 
numbers are different, each of you loses the larger number of points. Both of you have been given 
exactly these instructions. 
[Both participants choose a number.] 
 
Task 2 [HC] 
 
In this task you choose your number but the number of your paired participant is determined by 
computer. The computer has been programmed to enter any number from 1 to 10 with equal 
probability (1 and 10 included). Remember, if both numbers are the same, each of you wins that 
number of points. If the numbers are different, each of you loses the larger number of points. 
[The participant chooses the number, while the number for the paired participant is chosen according 
to the TR prediction.] 
 
Task 3 [HC] 
 
In this task your number will be determined by computer, so you do not have to do anything. The 
other number will be chosen by your paired participant.  
[The participant’s number is chosen according to the TR prediction, while the paired participant 
chooses her number herself.] 
 
END OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS for Experiment 2 
 
[Our explanatory  comments, not shown in the instructions, are shown between square brackets [ ]. 
Instructions are shown for the order HH-HC] 
 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. In this experiment you can earn money. You have 
been given 30 points initially so that your points total cannot be negative. At the end of the 
experiment your points will be converted to cash, according to the exchange rate:  
2 points = 1 euro. 
The experiment consists of 3 independent tasks; what you earn in one task does not affect what you 
can earn in another. How much you will earn depends on your decisions and the decisions of one 
other participant, who we shall call "your paired participant". Your paired participant is randomly 
selected at the start and remains paired with you for all three tasks.  
Throughout the experiment you will receive no information about the decisions of your paired 
participant or any other participant. At the end of the experiment you will learn the decisions of your 
paired participant, and will see your earnings. You will then be paid your earnings in private. 
Next, you will be given a general description of the tasks. More detailed instructions will be given at 
the start of each task. 
 
 
 
25 
Please do not communicate with other participants at any time.  Please also do not talk or give 
any comments during the experiment. During the experiment you are not allowed to ask us, or 
other participants, any questions. If something is wrong with your computer, please raise your hand. 
We will then come to your desk to check the problem. 
 
General description 
 
In each task two numbers will be determined between 1 and 10 (1 and 10 included), one for you and 
one for your paired participant.  
 
-- If both of you choose the same number,   [in Low:] and if it is a prime number, then you will both 
win that number of points.   [in Medium:] and if it solves the equation [ !7!8x ] you see written on 
the whiteboard, then you will both win that number of points.   [in Hard:] and if it solves the 
equation [ 959049 x ] you see written on the whiteboard, then you will both win that number of 
points. 
 
-- If both of you choose the same number,   [in Low:] and it is not a prime number, then you will both 
win one half of that number of points.   [in Medium:] and if it does not solve the equation you see 
written on the whiteboard, then you will both win one half of that number of points.   [in High:] and 
if it does not solve the equation you see written on the whiteboard, then you will both win four 
points. 
 
-- If the numbers are different, then each of you will lose the larger of these two numbers in points. 
 
The way in which the numbers are determined is different in each task. 
 
Control questions 
 
You will now have to answer four questions [with Yes/No] about the above procedure. You are not 
allowed to ask us or other participants any questions about the above rules. You will receive further 
instructions when all participants correctly answer all questions. 
 
1) If you and your paired participant get the same number, then you always earn points.  
2) If you get a different number than your paired participant, then you lose points.  
3) If you get a smaller number than your paired participant, then you lose his/her number in points. 
4) You and your paired participant always earn or lose the same number of points. 
 
Task 1 [HH] 
 
In this task you and your paired participant each choose a number between 1 and 10 (1 and 10 
included). Remember, if both numbers are the same, each of you earns points. If the numbers are 
different, each of you loses points. Both of you have been given exactly these instructions. 
[Both participants choose a number.] 
 
Task 2 [HC] 
 
In this task you choose your number but the number of your paired participant is determined by 
computer. The computer has been programmed to enter the number which gives the highest 
earnings if both participants choose it. Remember, if both numbers are the same, you and your 
paired participant each earns points. If the numbers are different, each of you loses points. 
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[The participant chooses the number, while the number for the paired participant is chosen according 
to the TR prediction.] 
 
Task 3 [HC] 
 
In this task your number will be determined by computer, so you do not have to do anything. The 
other number will be chosen by your paired participant. 
[The participant’s number is chosen according to the TR prediction, while the paired participant 
chooses her number herself.] 
 
 
END OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
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Appendix 3: Supplementary Material 
 
Experimental Design 
 
Experiment 1 
2 treatments were enacted in a within subject design. N=44 participants. 
1 experimental token was worth E0.5; an endowment of 30 electronic tokens was pre-
distributed. 
Order of treatments was counterbalanced. 
Paired subjects chose integers in the interval [1,10], winning the specified number of tokens 
in case of matching choices, but losing the larger number in case of non-matching choices. 
The game was one-shot. 
In treatment 1 each participant decided their integer choice freely. In treatment 2 each 
player (in turn) had to choose knowing that their partner’s integer was determined with 
uniform probability by the computer.  
No feedback was given on outcomes or earnings before the end of the experiment. 
The experiment was conducted in English.  
Length: approximately 30 minutes.  
Date: June 2006. Mean earnings: €8.30 
 
Experiment 2 
The design was as for experiment 1 with only the following differences: 
3 games were studied with separate samples for each game. N = 30, 28 and 32 respectively.  
Prizes for matching choices depended on specified mathematical properties of the integers 
in the interval [1,10]. We vary the payoff dominant equilibrium, and the difficulty of 
calculating it, across the three games.  
Treatment 1 took place before treatment 2; the design was, intentionally, not 
counterbalanced. 
In treatment 2 each player (in turn) had to choose knowing that their partner’s integer was 
determined via the computer program to be the integer yielding the highest payoff for each 
player in case of matching. This was known in advance of treatment 2.  
Date: 50% of observations were collected in June 2010, and 50% in June 2011. Mean 
earnings: €10.80 
 
Selection and Eligibility of Participants 
Participants were students at the University of Amsterdam, recruited by free enrolment into 
sessions, following the standard recruitment procedures at the Center for Experimental Economics 
and Political Decision-Making (CREED). CREED maintains a database of several thousand past and 
prospective participants. The database keeps track of all past individual participation. Recruitment 
for all sessions is organized via public announcement to all individuals in the database that had not 
participated in a similar experiment before. Individuals subscribe via a dedicated webpage 
www.creedexperiment.nl, where they select at most one session of the experiment, and are 
permitted to subscribe only if they never before participated in a similar experiment. The database is 
regularly enlarged through public advertisments to the students of various disciplines at the 
University of Amsterdam and the Free University in Amsterdam, who comprise the majority of 
participants. The experiment was open to students regardless of degree program or year. Every 
participant participated in only one session. It was specified in advance that the experiments would 
be conducted in English.  
